SEAHORSE procedure improvement system : development of instrument by Kurt, R. E. et al.
Kurt, R. E. and Arslan, V. and Khalid, H. and Comrie, E. and 
Boulougouris, E. and Turan, O. (2016) SEAHORSE procedure 
improvement system : development of instrument. In: International 
SEAHORSE Conference on Maritime Safety and Human Factors, 2016-
09-21 - 2016-09-23, Technology and Innovation Centre. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/66847/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 INTRODUCTION 
It was stated that maritime transport is 25 times riskier 
than air transport according to the accounts for deaths for 
every 100km travel (Berg, H. P., 2013). In the same 
paper, it was stated that operation of ships are subject to 
full of regulations, procedures and guidelines, which are 
expected to be adhered to by crew and officers.  
However, in some situations, instruction given to the 
bridge team may not be appropriate and may constitute 
supervisory violations as leaders find it difficult to adapt 
their instructions to changing situations due to possible 
poor safety culture. Similarly, (Darbra, R. M., et al, 2007) 
reports that coastal pilots in Australia and New Zeeland 
could not report hazards as much as they would like to 
due to the commercial pressure from the client shipping 
companies. Furthermore, a survey conducted reveals that 
71% of port pilots in New South Wales and 62% of port 
pilots in Western Australia agreed that commercial 
pressure forces pilots working out-side established rules 
(Darbra, R. M., et al, 2007). 
Moreover, International Safety Management (ISM) code, 
introduced in 1998, is aimed to bring self-regulation to 
WKH PDULWLPH LQGXVWU\  ,60 LV FULWLFLVHG GXH WR LW¶V
bureaucratic nature as it forces seafarers to fill many 
IRUPVDQGFKHFNOLVWUHVXOWLQJLQVHDIDUHUV¶WLPHDQGIRFXV
are taken away from working safely (Bhattacharya, 
2012). ISM requires shipping companies to develop work 
procedures involving management of risks, maintenance 
of ships and equipment, emergency preparedness as well 
as reporting incidents, accidents and near misses while 
auditing the current systems. On the other hand, due to 
downsizing of workforce, seafarers are expected to be 
multi-tasking and work longer hours while having fixed 
and short term contract. In the same paper, however, 
survey with managers indicated that most common cause 
IRU DFFLGHQWV DW VHD ZDV VHDIDUHUV¶ non-compliance with 
606 LQGLFDWLQJ VHDIDUHUV¶ DSDWK\ WRZDUGV IROORZLQJ
procedures (Bhattacharya, 2012). On the other hand, 
seafarers claimed that it is not the SMS but their skills 
gained through their long experience helped them to 
maintain shipboard safety. 
Three types of errors identified by Reason (Reason, 
1990) can be listed as Skill Based Performance, Rule 
Based Performance and Knowledge Based Performance. 
Rule based performance is the riskiest of all since rule 
breaking is seen as the contributory factor in most of 
serious incidents/accidents (Skalle, P. et al., 2014). Rule 
Based mistakes are done by the crew for a good reason as 
they do not intend to cause damage; people fail to apply 
the correct rule or procedure or expressed in another way, 
or implement an inappropriate rule and mostly caused by 
misjudging the problem (Skalle, P. et al., 2014).  In same 
paper, following a procedure is classified as both rule 
based and knowledge base, and therefore requires a lot of 
judgement to adjust the procedure to specific situations. 
Knudsen, F (Knudsen, F, 2009) states that efforts to 
improve safety resulted in increasing volume of 
regulations, control and paper work such as check-list, 
workplace assessment and risk assessment, and many 
seafarers view that these demands on seafarers are 
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imposed by people who do not understand anything about 
VHDIDUHU¶VOLIHDQGZRUN5XOHIROORZLQJLQVHYHUDOFDVHV
is seen as counteracting work against the proper 
seamanship. This may be due to the not well-developed 
rules/procedures.  Since humans are logical actors, 
deliberate additions and subtractions may be conceded 
irrespective of perceived risks in order to satisfy 
HPSOR\HUV¶ GHPDQG IRU HIILFLHQF\ DQG SURGXFWLYLW\ (O-
Ladan, S.B and Turan, O., 2012). 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are intended to 
provide a standardised means of working within a given 
organisation and is an attempt to make the system less 
dependent on human operators. However, to date, the 
HQYLVDJHGLPSDFWRI623¶VXSRQVDIHW\DFFLGHQWVKas not 
been achieved in the maritime industry. This may be 
attributable to the lack of standardisation between 
vessels, operations, environmental conditions, crew 
numbers and so on. Due to the lack of standardization 
between vessels and poorly designed Standard Operating 
procedures, measures introduced to eliminate the errors 
fail to sustain desired level of safety. Standardization is 
described as the accumulation of the efforts to prevent 
failures, which were revealed, based on accident 
investigations and the aggregations of learnt lessons from 
these accidents (Bieder and Bourrier, 2013). It is known 
that within the shipping industry the SOPs do not always 
match with operational realities and as such, seafarers, in 
some cases, deviate from the SOPs to complete their 
duties. These deviations conducted by crewmembers to 
overcome a problem or limitation presented by the SOPs, 
DUH KHUHE\ GHILQHG DV µZRUNDURXQGV¶ ,Q VRPH FDVHV
workarounds can present more practical, clever and even 
sometimes innovative means of carrying out duties; 
however, they may also result in significant risks. Hence, 
a methodology is required to collect workaround data and 
to inform decision-making about potential improvements 
to the SOP.  
This paper presents the instrument developed, as part of 
SEAHORSE project, for the collection of SOPs and their 
workarounds and demonstrates its validity for the 
purpose. 
2 SEAHORSE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The SEAHORSE project aims to capture current 
maritime workarounds through application of anonymous 
surveys. In the context of SEAHORSE project, a 
workaround is defined as a non-standardized shortcut of 
performing a given task. For the purpose of establishing 
the workarounds being practiced by seafarers, a 
SEAHORSE Questionnaire was carefully developed with 
an interdisciplinary group to ensure that it captures the 
information needed for further analyses. It consists of 
three main sections as depicted in Figure 1 and briefly 
explained in subsequent paragraphs. 
 
 
Figure 1. Main Sections of SEAHORSE Questionnaire. 
2.1 Section-1: Demographics 
The first section of the questionnaire aims to collect 
demographic information about the respondents. 
However, it was ensured that anonymity of respondents is 
maintained, therefore, no personal information was 
collected which could lead to identification of the person. 
This section consisted of the questions related to: 
x Role/ rank  
x Seagoing experience  
x Type of vessel on which service is being/ was 
rendered  
x Type of shipping company operation  
x Number of SOPs dealt with on daily basis 
x Nationality 
2.2 Section-2: Perceptions and Attitudes 
The second section focused on capturing the perception 
and attitudes of seafarer where respondents were asked to 
agree or disagree with the given statements on a Likert 
Scale (i.e. never, rarely, some-times, often, always). All 
TXHVWLRQVLQWKLVVHFWLRQKDGWKHRSWLRQRIµ'RQRWNQRZ¶
In the subsequent analyses, this option was considered as 
missing value. The perception and attitude section is had 
questions related to: 
x Design aspects of the SOPs 
x Efficacies of the SOPs 
x Training, competence  
x Safety culture  
x Employee-employer trust  
x Matching procedures to operational reality  
2.3 Section-3: Workarounds 
The third and last section of the SEAHORSE 
questionnaire aims to collect the data of workarounds 
opted by the respondents, if any. The following questions 
are presented to the respondents in this section: 
x Define existing SOP  
x Define alternative adopted (workaround) 
x Commonality of workaround  
x Operation type  
x Operation location  
x SOP Impracticability  
x Benefits of workaround  
x Risks of workaround  
x Risks of workaround  
3 SUMMARY OF DEMOGRAPHICS 
The SEAHORSE questionnaires were distributed to a 
wide range of seafarers by the project partners. A total of 
453 survey questionnaires were returned by the 
respondents with 294 workarounds reported. 
More than 65 % of participants who joined our survey 
reported workarounds and 65% of the workarounds 
reported stated that most or all crew members do the 
same workaround. More than 50% of workarounds were 
reported in deck operations while most workarounds 
reported are applicable to whole ship followed by Engine 
room and Navigation /communication control space 
workarounds. The workarounds were categorized under 
108 group of workaround. Initial scan of the survey 
indicated that the most common workarounds are located 
in the areas of reporting paperwork, personal protective 
equipment, Work-Rest hours, navigational rules and 
standards, and Hot-Work and permit to work. 
This section summarizes the demographic data collected 
through the SEAHORSE smart procedure survey. 
3.1 Role/ rank summary 
The role/rank distribution of the SEAHORSE smart 
procedure survey respondents is shown in Figure 2 
below. It can be seen that most of the respondents are of 
RIILFHUV¶FDGUHVZLWKWKHPDMRULW\EHLQJVKLSV¶PDVWHUV 
 
Figure 2. Role/ rank distribution of the SEAHORSE survey 
respondents 
The above distribution may not be reflecting an unbiased 
sample (accounting for all seamen), but is a good 
representation of the seafarers dealing with SOPs most of 
the time. 
3.2 Seagoing experience summary 
The overall seagoing experience of the survey 
respondents is summarized in Figure 3 below. It can be 
observed from the figure that approximately 40% of the 
respondents are relatively new to the maritime sector 
with less than 5 years of seagoing experience. On the 
other hand, almost 35% of the respondents fall under the 
category of veteran seafarer with more than 15 years of 
seagoing experience. Thus, the questionnaire database is 
representative of seafarers with a vast range of seagoing 
experience, which is typical of the modern maritime 
sector. 
 
Figure 3. Overall seagoing experience of the respondents  
3.3 Type of vessel summary 
The distribution of most recent type of ship respondents 
were working on or had worked on previously is shown 
in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4'LVWULEXWLRQRIUHVSRQGHQWV¶YHVVHOW\SH 
The majority of the respondents had experience of 
working on goods carriers. Almost 20% of the 
respondents returning the survey questionnaire have 
experience with working on passenger vessels. This 
distribution is also aligned with the typical distribution of 
marine vessels in the maritime sector. 
3.4 Type of shipping company operation summary  
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of type of shipping 
company operations. It can be observed from the figure 
that almost 55% of the respondents returning the survey 
questionnaire are involved in deep sea operations, which 
reflects prolonged stay at sea. Only, 35% respondents 
were involved in shortsea shipping operations. 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of type of shipping operations  
The relationship between ship types and their typical 
operations can be seen in Figure 6 .  
 
Figure 6. Ship type wise distribution of shipping operations  
It appears from the above figure that goods carriers are 
mostly involved in deep-sea operations, whereas most of 
the passenger vessels are engaged in shortsea operations. 
This observation is also aligned with the typical 
operational profile of the ships in maritime domain. 
3.5 Number of SOPs dealt with on a daily basis-
summary 
The distribution of SOPs handled on a daily basis by 
seafarers is given in Figure 7. It can be seen that around 
40% of the respondents deal with more than ten SOPs on 
a daily basis. 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of SOPs handled on a daily basis  
3.6 Attitudes Results 
In the attitude section of the questionnaire, the intention 
was to measure the safety climate in the company. In 
total 48 attitude questions were asked and questionnaire 
was structured as below: 
x Procedure Design 
x Training, competence 
x Safety Culture 
x Employee ± Employer Trust 
x Matching Procedures to Operational Reality 
 
Each heading has several questions to capture the general 
understanding of the seafarer about that specific area.  
There is a still big debate on what extend SOPs reflect the 
operational realities. Seafarers stated that majority of 
Standard Operating Procedures are factually incorrect. 
Also, seafarers are doubtful if SOPs really reflect the best 
way of working or even they make the operations less 
efficient as described in Figure 8 and 9 
 
 
Figure 8 Job tasks and related procedures required to be 
followed on ships are factually incorrect 
 
 Figure 9 Some procedures that crew need to follow as part 
of their job tasks make the job less efficient 
Significant efforts are invested to enhance competency of 
the crew members with appropriate and continues 
trainings by shipping companies to sustain desired level 
of safety. However, seafarers stated in the survey that 
they are not always trained on how to deal with unusual 
conditions, see Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 In our company crew members are trained on 
how to deal with unusual (infrequent) conditions  
SOPs are introduced to maritime domain for every single 
task and for every crew member from different rank but 
many of them ignore following them and adopt their own 
alternative way due to many reasons.  
 
Figure 11 In shipping companies, it is common that 
procedures are not always followed. 
Figure 11 illustrates that 37% of the crew sometimes 
follow the defined SOPs.  
In order to establish a good employer ± employee trust, 
there should be anonymous reporting system where crew 
member can report impractical SOPs to avoid possible 
risks to person, ship and environment. Figure 12 indicates 
that only 26% of the companies have this system in their 
SMS. 
 
Figure 12. In our company, there are systems on board 
which allow crew members to report impracticable procedures 
anonymously. 
 
Personnel Protective Equipment is extremely important 
for maritime operations to protect human from dangerous 
situations. Figure 3 shows that most of the people 
determined that they use PPE when it is required but 
workaround survey results show that ignoring the use of  
PPEs are very common in maritime domain. 
 
 
Figure 13 the members of our crew, use personal protective 
equipment when required. 
4 RISK BENEFIT ANALYSES OF WORKAROUNDS 
A workshop was held at the University of Strathclyde to 
facilitate evaluations of the collected workaround, by 
field experts. A total of 34 field experts participated in 
the workshop and were randomly divided into four 
groups to assess 107 valid workarounds 
4.1 :RUNDURXQGV¶HYDOXDWLRQVE\WKHILHOGH[SHUWV 
Each expert of a given group was asked to rate (using 
five-point Likert scale) the SOPs and their workarounds 
allocated to the group on the following: 
x Efficacy of the workarounds  
x (YDOXDWLRQ RI 623V¶ DQG ZRUNDURXQGV¶ EHQHILWV
in terms of (1) Practicality (2) Time efficiency 
(3) Cost efficiency (4) Regulatory compliance 
and (5) Safety  
x Evaluation of S23V¶ DQG LWV ZRUNDURXQGV¶ ULVNV
in terms of (1) Risk to Person (2) Risk to Ship (3) 
Risk to Environment (4) Risk to Operation 
4.2 Common factor analysis of risks and benefits of 
SOPs/workarounds 
In order to condense the number of factors representing 
risks and benefits associated with the SOPs/workarounds, 
common factor analysis was carried out. A total of three 
ODWHQW IDFWRUV RI H[SHUWV¶ HYDOXDWLRQ RI
SOPs/workarounds were identified as summarized in 
Table 1 below: 
Table 1 /DWHQWIDFWRUVRIH[SHUWV¶HYDOXDWLRQV 
S.No. Factor Subscale] 
1. Procedure 
pragmatism 
a. Time Efficiency 








3. Risk a. Risk to Person 
b. Risk to Ship 
c. Risk to Environment 
d. Risk to Operation 
4.3 6XPPDU\RIH[SHUWV¶HYDOXDWLRQVRIZRUNDURXQGV 
([SHUWV¶ RSLQLRQ RQ WKH IROORZLQJ DVSHFWV RI HDFK
workaround in comparison to corresponding SOP were 
analysed: 
x Efficacy 
x Pragmatism  
x Statutory compliance 
x Risks 
It is worth mentioning that workaround efficacy was 
FDOFXODWHGDVWKHSHUFHQWDJHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHµ\HV¶
DQG µQR¶ UHSOLHV RIDOO H[SHUWV RI UHOHYDQW JURXS$OVRD
studentised t-test was conducted to statistically validate 
the observed differences. For the remaining three aspects 
RI 623ZRUNDURXQG LH µSUDJPDWLVP¶ µVWDWXWRU\
FRPSOLDQFH¶ DQG µULVNV¶ WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ PHDQ
scores of workaround and associated SOP was calculated 
and divided by 4 [5 (highest value) ± 1(lowest value)] to 
establish percentage difference in the opinions of experts. 
The percentage summary statistics of workaround 
efficacies are graphically presented in Figure 14 below. It 
can be seen from below figure that majority of 
workarounds (57.9%) were considered by the field 
experts to be beneficial. Around 40% were thought to be 
non-beneficial and only 2% were benign in nature. 
 
Figure 14. Efficacies of workarounds [N=107]  
Figure 85 is depicting the percentage distribution of 
pragmatism of workarounds in comparison to SOPs. 
 
Figure 85. Pragmatism of workarounds in comparison with 
SOPs [N=107]  
It is evident from above figure, that majority of 
workaround (71%) were considered by field experts to 
have similar practicality features as the original SOPs. 
Nevertheless, a reasonable number of workarounds 
(27%) did display better pragmatism than SOPs. The best 
workaround, displaying 61% improvement over SOP is 
summarized below: 
Table 2 Example workaround reported against the SOP. 
S.# Description Details 
1.  SOP Company procedure for agitating 
mud was not based on type of mud 
agitators and tank configuration on 
board with result procedure could 
not be used. 
2.  Workaround 8VHGPDQXIDFWXUHUV¶LQVWUXFWLRQV
along with a method of circulating 
mud that worked in practice. 
 
It can be seen that this particular workaround is rather 
related to improvements that can be applied to the 
existing SOP. On similar lines, the workarounds 
displaying better practicality are mainly related to 
improvements in existing SOPs. Interestingly, around 2% 
workarounds were considered to be worse than actual 
SOPs by the field experts. The summary statistics of 
statutory compliance features of workarounds in 
comparison to relevant SOPs is shown in Figure 16 
below. 
 
Figure 96. Statutory compliance of workarounds in comparison 
with SOPs [N=107]  
It can be seen from above figure that more than 2/3 
workarounds were considered to be worse than 
corresponding SOP when it comes to compliance with 
statutory regulations. Here, the worst case (83% decline) 
is reproduced below: 
Table 3 Example workaround reported against the SOP 
S.# Description Details 
1.  SOP Enclosed space entry requires SCBA 
(self-contained breathing apparatus), 
harness and resuscitator to be placed 
at entrance. 
2.  Workaround Crew often disregard placing SCBA, 
harness and resuscitator at entrance. 
 
It goes without saying that this procedure is likely to be a 
serious safety hazard for the crew members and must be 
avoided on all cost. 
/DVWO\ WKHULVNV¶FRPSDULVRQRIZRUNDURXQGVZLWK623V
are summarised in Figure 107 below. 
 
Figure 107. Risks of workarounds in comparison with SOPs 
[N=107]  
It is evident from above figure that in the opinions of 
field experts, more than 57% workarounds pose greater 
risks than the actual SOPs. Here, the worst case (46% 
decline over SOP) is reproduced below: 
Table 4 Example workaround reported against the SOP 
S.# Description Details 
1.  SOP Drills should be conducted as per 
schedule 
2.  Workaround Drills often are not conducted 
 
Various drills on board marine vessels play vital role for 
life saving in case of any unfortunate event. Thus, it is 
not surprising that evaluators found this workaround to 
SOP as a great increase in risk for the crew, especially, 
considering the modern trend of frequent crew rotations. 
Almost, 40% workarounds were considered by the field 
experts to have similar risks level as those of the original 
SOPs. 
5 SEAHORSE PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT 
SYSTEM  
The improvement of SOPs is one of the main focal points 
in many sectors and companies have made considerable 
efforts to do so. Several shipping companies regularly 
review their SOPs and try to identify impractical SOPs 
and appropriate means to improve them. However, the 
maritime industry, to date, has not developed any 
workaround management tool in the maritime industry.  
SEAHORSE Procedure Improvement System (PIS) 
Methodology aims to develop a comprehensive 
methodology to capture workarounds performed by 
seafarers within a company, assess them and compare 
them to SOPs in order to find the most effective and safe 
way of working. A small group of expert reviewers is 
assigned by the company to assess the workaround and 
SOP as described in section 6. All assessments are 
aggregated into a result that captures how much better (or 
worse) a specific workaround is than the SOP. These 
results are then distributed within the company.  
The SEAHORSE PIS has also been developed in a 
software-based platform for the purpose being to ease the 
work of the managers and improve SOPs in a structured 
way. Its implementation will facilitate the improvement 
of SOPs and identify the number of impractical SOPs. 
Considering that the maritime industry is based heavily 
on SOPs, the adoption of this methodology will have a 
significant impact in terms of safety. 
SEAHORSE PIS, developed to support the collection, 
assessment and decision making related to workarounds 
practiced in the maritime industry. A general overview of 
the methodology is shown in Figure 18. The 
methodology consists of three main stages: 1) gathering 
of workaround data and development of attributes, 2) 
ranking and selection of alternatives various techniques 
and 3) final decision-making by administrator and 
feedback provided to seafarer and reviewers.  
 
Figure 118. SEAHORSE Procedure Improvement SYSTEM 
The SEAHORSE PIS is a pioneering methodology, 
which has been tested by shipping companies and are 
being utilised to improve and develop SOPs.  System is 
available online and can be deployed using computer, 
tablets and smartphones, allowing shipping companies to 
bring the experts together in virtual environment. This 
allows very quick assessment, response and 
implementation opportunities.   The tools could also be 
utilised within other domains such as the aviation 
industry 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
SEAHORSE project has developed a very comprehensive 
original survey instrument that could be easily used by 
maritime industry to evaluate and decide upon the 
workarounds being followed by seafarers on marine 
vessels.  
In the absence, of a priori hypothetical factors being 
measured by the survey instrument, exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) technique was used to unearth the 
underlying factors being recorded by the SEAHORSE 
smart survey questionnaire. EFA revealed that a total of 
nine latent factors (SOP Usefulness, SOP Accuracy, SOP 
Practicability, SOP Phraseology, Training, Safety SOP 
Implementation, Assuring Confidentiality, Abiding 
Rules, and Discipline) exist in the first two sections. 
Whereas, only three (Procedure pragmatism, Procedure 
statutory compliance, and Risk) could be identified in the 
last section. 
The survey tools developed as part of SEAHORSE 
project can be used to assess and decide upon usefulness, 
pragmatism, statutory compliance and risks of 
workarounds being followed by seafarers. In case of 
positive outcome SOPs may be reviewed or measures to 
be undertaken to curtail workarounds in case these are 
found to be hazardous  
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